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Abstract
In rural areas in developing countries gender inequality tends to be severe which might have
substantial welfare implications if it determines how scarce economic resources are shared
between men and women. Therefore, it is important to know how gender influences re-
source sharing and - given the strong embeddedness of resource sharing in social networks
- in what ways social ties interact with this influence. To investigate this, we combine data
from resource allocation experiments and a social network survey in rural Nicaragua. We
find that women share less than men, and that this difference is largest among people of
the same village and of different gender. We also find that social ties exert an important
influence on sharing and that women have fewer friendship ties within their village than
men. Regression analysis shows important gender differences in the effect of social ties
on sharing. While both men and women share more with female friends than with female
non-friends, women share less with male friends than with male non-friends. We also find
that with controls for friendship ties, there remains a direct gender effect on within-village
sharing, with men sharing more than women. Finally, we find that our results are robust to
potential gender differences in the reporting of social ties.
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1. Introduction
In rural villages in developing countries resource sharing is very common and strongly em-
bedded in social networks. This is important for local welfare as well as the effectiveness of
policies that aim to improve welfare (Ligon and Schechter, 2012). At the same time, in these
villages gender inequality is ubiquitous and women tend to have a less favourable access to
resources (World Bank, 2012). Given the economic and political importance of gender in-
equality, the importance of social networks for sharing and the role of sharing for welfare in
rural villages, it is important to look more closely at the interaction between gender, social ties
and resource sharing.
We start with the assumption that social proximity in networks increases sharing, for which
there is growing empirical support (Leider et al., 2009; Goeree et al., 2010; Bran˜as-Garza et al.,
2010; Ligon and Schechter, 2012), and we add a gender lens by addressing the following ques-
tions. First, to what extent can gender differences in sharing be explained by gender differences
in social networks? Women tend to face more severe constraints, in terms of time poverty
(Blackden and Wodon, 2006) and spatial mobility (Mandel, 2006; Hanson, 2010), both the
result of the existing gendered division of labour. As a result, women may be socially less
connected with others in their village, which in turn may lower their generosity towards others.
There may also be considerable sorting on gender in the formation of social ties, which would
lower sharing with people of different gender. Second, to what extent can gender differences
in sharing be explained by gender differences in the valuation of friendship ties? The higher
mobility and time constraints that women face may make it more difficult for them to take
advantage of any social ties, which may lower their importance to them. Third, are there any
gender differences in the reporting of friendship ties, which need to be taken into account? We
know from recent studies that it is very common for responses to diverge when two people are
asked about a possible relation between them (see, e.g., Comola and Fafchamps, 2014). It is
important to take this into account, especially when such divergence may be correlated with
gender.
To study these questions we surveyed almost all households in a rural village in Nicaragua
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and elicited the whole network of friendship ties of both spouses in every household (which
for convenience we will call ’household heads’). After the survey we conducted a series of
incentivised resource sharing experiments, using so-called ’dictator games’. In these games
household heads (dictators) could share financial resources with randomly selected other vil-
lagers as well as non-anonymous strangers outside the village (recipients). Combining survey
and experimental data we explore how the gender of the dictator and the recipient influence
sharing decisions. To address question 1, we test whether gender effects on resource sharing
work directly or indirectly through the influence of gender on the formation of friendship ties
by comparing regressions with and without controls for social ties. Question 2 is addressed by
including interaction terms between gender matchings and reported friendship ties. For ques-
tion 3 we exploit an important feature of our data, namely that we have perspectives from both
nodes on the same dyad. This allows us to identify discordant reporting, and test whether it
matters for the estimation of the effect of friendship ties on sharing across dyads of different
gender combinations.
The results can be summarized as follows. First, women tend to share less than men, and
this difference is largest when dictator and recipient live in the same village and have different
gender. Second, these differences in sharing are in part driven by gender differences in the
prevalence of social ties as women have on average fewer friendship ties within their village.
Third, gender differences in sharing are also driven by the differential effect of social ties
on sharing. More specifically, while both men and women share more with female friends
than with female non-friends, women share less with male friends than with male non-friends.
Fourth, when controlling for friendship ties, there remains a direct gender effect on sharing
with people in the same village, with men sharing more than women. Finally, we find that our
results are robust to potential gender differences in the reporting of social ties.
Several studies are related to ours. First, over the last three decades, there has been a bur-
geoning literature that uses experimental methods to study gender differences in resource shar-
ing. Many of them used university subjects, and showed a large variety in outcomes, although
contrary to our findings, none of them found women to be less generous than men.1 A growing
number of studies have taken the lab to the field in developing countries, and many of them
3
included gender controls in their analysis. The ones that used dictator games, as we do, did
not find statistically significant gender effects (e.g. Binzel and Fehr (2013) in Cairo; Jakiela
(2011) in Kenya; Gowdy et al. (2003) in Nigeria; Ligon and Schechter (2012) in Paraguay;
Ado and Kurosaki (2014) in Jakarta).2 One exception is Gurven et al. (2008), who found that
men in the Bolivian Amazone give more than women, which is consistent with our findings,
but they did not give an explanation for this finding. Second, another line of experimental re-
search has developed around how sharing is influenced by social proximity (Bohnet and Frey,
1999; Charness and Gneezy, 2008). Some of these studies have looked at the role of real-life
social ties for resource sharing. Leider et al. (2009) found a positive effect of social proximity
in social networks on resource sharing among students at a US university, a result replicated
by Goeree et al. (2010) with teenage girls at a high school and Bran˜as-Garza et al. (2010) with
undergraduate economics students in Spain, and recently extended to developing countries by
Ligon and Schechter (2012) with villagers in rural Paraguay.3
The rest of the article is organised as follows. Section 2 describes our research design,
including the social tie elicitation procedure and the procedures followed in the dictator game
experiment. Section 3 presents the empirical analyses and section 4 discusses the results and
concludes.
2. Research design
In the following we describe the main elements of our research design, which consists of a
survey which elicits social ties, a standard survey that captures socio-economic characteristics,
and a controlled resource sharing experiment. We also present some theoretical considerations.
2.1. Data collection
From all households in a rural village one randomly selected household head was selected to
participate in a resource sharing experiment. More specifically, each participant played six
subsequent so-called ‘dictator games’ with different recipients. The experimenter explained
each participant who was in the role of a dictator that he or she would sequentially receive six
small cylinder-boxes each containing 20 coins of one Co´rdoba, c$ (the Nicaraguan currency),
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which he or she could (but need not) share with one other named person. For each dictator the
first recipient was a stranger, that is, an unknown but named person from another village in the
region. That the stranger was named allowed dictators to know the gender of the recipient. The
five subsequent recipients were randomly selected village members.
The random selection involved the dictator drawing cards out of a bag containing all 123
household heads. Only after the dictator had finished the sharing decision regarding a recipient
the name of the subsequent recipient was drawn. Dictators were informed of the procedures
before they made any decision and, hence, knew that their maximum possible earnings would
be c$ 120,- (USD 6.70 at the time of the experiment). These potential earnings corresponded
to more than a two days average income in Nicaragua. After explaining the instructions par-
ticipants were given the opportunity to ask questions and if we identified that (part of) the
instructions were unclear we provided additional explanations. This procedure made that all
participants understood the instructions before making any decisions.4
We planned to conduct the experiment with all households in the village and had to make
sure that the chance of contagion was minimized. Therefore, only one household head per
household was allowed to participate as a dictator. In case of a two-headed household it was
randomly determined who of the two was asked to participate. We did not exclude participa-
tion of the other household head in the role of recipient, but ensured that heads of the same
household were not matched as a dictator-recipient pair.
Each dictator was made aware that, although he or she knew the identity of the recipient,
the recipient did not know and also would not get to know from us who had given the money.
When delivering the money to recipients we did neither reveal the identity of the dictator(s) who
sent the money, nor did we inform them about how many dictators had participated. Dictators
and recipients did also not learn anything about others’ earnings. All this was known by the
dictators when they made their decisions.
This one-way anonymity design provides some advantages over both a complete anony-
mous design, where receivers and dictators do not know each other’s identity, and a full disclo-
sure design, where receivers and dictators do know each other’s identity.5 First, compared to
complete anonymity, one-way anonymity enables dictators to take account of real-life socio-
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economic characteristics of the recipient, including gender, friendship ties and other important
factors that may influence resource sharing.6 Second, compared to a full disclosure design, it is
less likely that anticipated reciprocity and sanctions influence sharing decisions. In fact, in our
design, resource sharing should be mainly influenced by (directed) altruism, which has been
shown to be one of the most important drivers of sharing in friendship relations (Leider et al.,
2009).7
We organized the experiment in a decentralized way, by having Nicaraguan research as-
sistants visiting individual participants at their house to conduct the experiment. In doing so
we deliberately deviated from the often used protocol in lab-in-the-field experiments, where
experiments are often centrally conducted at a public spot. We did so for the following two
reasons. First, we wanted to minimize selection bias. Organising the experiment at a public
spot would open the door for self-selection as some people are reluctant to participate in public
events, which might be correlated with their generosity and number of friendship ties. Second,
during such gatherings mutual influence among participants is hard to control, and we antici-
pated that people’s behaviour would be influenced by the identity of the other participants at
such an event, including their gender.8
To minimize experimenter effects due to the assistant’s presence we employed the follow-
ing three precautionary measures. First, all decisions were made in full privacy. As a rule
participants went inside their house or to a separate room and were, thus, out of sight of the
assistant when making a decision. If this was not possible the assistant turned his or her back
when the dictator was handling the coins. The dictators were also instructed not to make any
comments about their decisions. Second, after having taken from the box the coins they wanted
to keep, dictators had to fill the box with metal rings. This ensured that the weight of the box
remained constant irrespective of the amount of coins taken out. Third, after each decision the
box was sealed with tape. The decisions were recorded by the assistants’ supervisor (one of the
authors) who did not have any interaction with the participants. The dictators were made aware
of these procedural details before they made any decisions.9
An important aspect in controlled experiments is that participants trust the researchers. This
is not necessarily guaranteed when participants have no experience with economic experiments.
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Therefore, to build trust, we first conducted the household and social tie survey. This ensured
that the research assistants were already known to the local people when they visited them for
the experiment. Another important element was the support of the well-respected local com-
munity leaders, who at the start of the field research presented our team to each household
and asked people to cooperate with the research team. By conducting the whole experiment
in only one day we minimized possible contagion effects. We administered debriefing ques-
tions which showed that 94.5% of the participants did not talk about the experiment with other
village members who had already participated before, hence contagion is virtually absent. In
addition, the research assistants were asked to make a subjective evaluation about the partici-
pant’s dedication, trust and understanding of the experiment. We did not notice any problems
that could have affected the dictators’ decisions.
The experiment was organised immediately after the surveys that captured basic socio-
economic data as well as social ties with other household heads from the same village. For
the latter we adapted a survey method successfully employed by economic anthropologists
and sociologists for mapping bounded networks.10,11 Specifically, to elicit the social ties of an
interviewee we used a stack of small cards representing all households in the village. Each
card held the name(s) of the head(s) of a household. For each of the cards the interviewee was
first asked whether he or she knew the household. If they knew the household they were asked
whether he or she had a “social relation of any kind” with (one of) the household head(s). If
the answer was affirmative we asked for details on the content of the relation. The use of cards
gave us an easy way to avoid any order bias in the elicitation of the ties, by reshuffling the cards
at the start of every new interview.12
2.2. Theoretical considerations
To structure the analysis, we use the following model. Following Andreoni and Miller (2002)
we assume that for each pair of players i and j the individual utility of player i depends on
the own pay-off pii and the pay-off of the matched player j, pi j. We assume that the pay-offs
are directly determined by the distribution decision of player i and that this decision remains
unknown to j. Specifically, the pay-offs are determined by subject i’s decision to keep x out
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of an endowment E for herself and to give the remainder E− x to person j, to maximize her
utility determined by the utility function Ui(x,E − x;αi j). The parameter αi j ∈ [0,1] weighs
the importance of the amount given to the recipient versus the amount kept x. The larger its
value the more will be given to the matched recipient. It can be seen as a measure of i’s
altruism towards j and consists of two components with αi j = α0i +α1i Pi j and α0i ≥ 0 and
α1i ≥ 0 (for a similar approach see eg. Leider et al. (2007)). The first component represents
i’s baseline altruism and the second measures i’s directed altruism, with Pi j being the social
proximity between i and j. It captures the idea that people tend to attribute a higher weight
to the income of close others (Bohnet and Frey, 1999; Charness and Gneezy, 2008). In our
setting we distinguish three levels of proximity: strangers (i.e. they live in a different village),
acquaintances when they live in the same village but are not friends, and friends who live in the
same village.
Importantly, we expect gender differences in α0i , α1i and Pi j. First, there may be a gender
difference in baseline altruism (α0i ). In line with some of the experimental literature discussed
above, baseline altruism may be larger for women than for men. However, the development
economics literature suggests that women may get more utility out of keeping x than men,
which would make baseline altruism actually lower for women than for men, implying an op-
posite hypothesis. It has been documented that women have a stronger preference to spend
resources on human capital, such as health, food related household consumption and their chil-
dren (Thomas, 1990, 1993; Kennedy and Peters, 1992; Thomas, 1993; Hoddinott and Haddad,
1995; Phipps and Burton, 1998; Yoong et al., 2012; Dunbar et al., 2013). Such preference may
make women share less than men with people outside their household.
Second, the directed altruism component α1i Pi j may also be different between men and
women. Pi j may differ if women, compared to men, are on average more socially distant from
other people in their village, which in turn would make women share less with other people in
their village. Women may be socially less connected with others in their village, as they tend to
face more severe constraints in terms of time poverty (Blackden and Wodon, 2006) and spatial
mobility (Mandel, 2006; Hanson, 2010), both the result of the existing gendered division of
labour. There may also be considerable levels of sorting on gender in social ties as identified by
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some empirical studies (Attanasio et al., 2012; Bastani, 2007; Comola and Fafchamps, 2014;
Marsden, 1987; Wellman, 2007; Stehl et al., 2013). In addition, α1i may differ across different
gender combinations. The higher mobility and time constraints that women face may make it
more difficult for them to take advantage of any social ties, which might lower their importance
to them. Also, same-gender ties may be more valued than mixed-gender ties, as individuals who
are similar are more likely to interact with each other (for a literature review on ‘homophily’
effects see McPherson et al., 2001)).
Each of these hypotheses will be tested using regressions that include social proximity,
gender of the dictator and recipient, and interactions between social proximity and the gender of
dictator and recipient as main explanatory variables. Any significant effect of the gender of the
dictator and recipient in such regression suggests a gender difference in baseline altruism, i.e.
our first hypothesis. To study the second hypothesis, regarding the role of Pi j, we will analyse
gender differences in the prevalence of social ties and test whether controlling for social ties in
the regressions captures any of the gender variation in sharing. The third hypothesis regarding
the role of α1i and its interaction with gender, will be tested with the estimates of the interaction
terms.
3. Results
In this section we present the empirical results. We start with a description of the study location,
after which we present a descriptive analysis of the sharing decisions. Thereafter, we employ
regression analysis to look into the influence of gender, friendship ties (and their interaction)
on resource sharing. We end with several robustness tests.
3.1. Location
For this study we selected a village located in a rural area in the Northern part of the Pacific
region of Nicaragua. It was purposively selected as it is representative for this area. The
difficult agro-ecological conditions (dry season, irregular rainfall, low fertility of soils, etc.)
make agricultural activities not very profitable in this region. Cattle breeding is one of the most
lucrative economic activities because it is both an income source and an important savings
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instrument that enables local people to bridge the long and harsh dry season.
The village consists of 66 households of which 9 are single-headed and 57 two-headed. This
size is similar to other villages in the area. Of the 123 household heads in total, 61 are male and
62 are female. We collected data on 58 households (87.9%) and at least 100 household heads
(81.3%). Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of important socio-economic characteristics. It
indicates a pronounced diversity across households as well as household heads. 34.48% of the
households own land and land possession is unequally distributed, with the standard deviation
being more than twice as large as the mean of 11.74 hectares. For cattle possession the figures
are similar: 46.55% of all households possess cattle, and the average number of cattle per
household is 3.55 with a standard deviation of 9.44. We also calculated a wealth index equal
to the first factor of a maximum likelihood factor analysis using economic assets such as land,
cattle and the possession of tools/equipment which are good proxies for wealth in the region.
The second panel of the table summarizes individual characteristics of household heads,
and the third panel summarizes individual and household characteristics of the household heads
who participated as dictators in the experiment. Average education of household heads in the
village, measured in number of years of schooling, is only slightly above 4 years with also quite
some variation. Another potentially important characteristic is the number of years of residence
in the village, the average of which is around 33 years. The average frequency of contact with
the urban centre, which is important to obtain access to economic goods and services, is around
2 visits, as measured in the most recent month before our survey.
Average differences between men and women in the village on individual characteristics
(not reported in the table) are as follows. Men are on average 5.71 years older than women
(p= 0.041, two-sided t-test). This is in line with average age differences between husbands and
wives in rural Nicaragua. Other differences are not statistically significant: education (average
difference = -0.74; p = 0.290, two-sided t-test), residence in village (average difference = 4.76,
p = 0.131, two-sided t-test) and visits to urban centre (average difference = 1.06, p = 0.117,
two-sided t-test).
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Table 1: Summary statistics of important socio-economic characteristics
mean/percentage st.dev. no. of obs.
a. Households
Land (percentage of owners) 34.48 − 58
Land (mean in ha.) 11.74 24.76 58
Cattle (percentage of owners) 46.55 − 58
Cattle (mean in no. of animals) 3.55 9.44 58
Wealth (index) 0.00 1.75 58
b. Household heads
Gender (percentage male) 49.50 − 109
Age (mean in years) 46.05 14.49 109
Education (mean in years) 4.13 3.59 109
Residence in village (mean in years) 33.22 15.63 100
Visits to urban centre (mean no. last month) 2.07 3.36 100
c. Dictators
Gender (percentage male) 47.37 − 57
Age (mean in years) 44.16 12.78 57
Wealth (index) −0.07 1.65 57
Education (mean in years) 3.72 3.30 57
Residence in village (mean in years) 32.91 15.40 57
Visits to urban centre (mean no. last month) 2.10 2.61 57
3.2. Descriptive analysis of sharing
We start with a descriptive analysis of sharing decisions, and how they depend on the gender of
the dictator and recipient. Then, we look at the role of social proximity, by studying whether it
influences sharing, whether it correlates with gender, and whether its effect on sharing depends
on gender.
3.2.1. Sharing and gender
Figure 1 presents the distribution of coins given to the recipient (including strangers and fellow
villagers), disaggregated by the gender of the dictator. For both male and female dictators we
observe large variation in allocations with a dominant mode at the equal split of 10 coins. These
distributions indicate that women tend to share less resources than men. On average women
leave 8.78 coins (st.dev. 4.68) and men leave 10.36 coins (st.dev. 4.65) to the recipient.
Intriguingly, there is a relatively large share of decisions where dictators leave more than
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Figure 1: Resource sharing by gender of dictator
50% of the coins to the recipient. Two factors may account for this generous behaviour. First,
before taking a decision dictators were given the name of the recipient.13 Second, as in most
small-scale societies, in this village most people know each other (based on our social ties data,
in 93.5% of all possible ties the other was known).
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Figure 2: Resource sharing by gender of dictator and recipient
In a next step, we take the gender of the recipient into account. Figure 2 shows the cu-
mulative distributions of resource sharing of male and female dictators for same gender pairs
(panel a) and different gender pairs (panel b). These distributions again indicate that women
tend to share less than men do, and that the differences become stronger when the dictator and
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recipient have different gender, as a comparison of both panels shows.
Table 2: Sharing by gender combination
women men
mean N mean N p-value
a. All pairs
same gender 9.09 96 10.39 84 0.204
different gender 8.42 84 10.33 78 0.117
b. Same village pairs
same gender 9.19 80 10.55 67 0.190
different gender 8.16 70 10.63 68 0.042**
Notes: t-test with standard errors corrected for multiple decisions per
dictator. ***, **, * indicate two-sided significance levels at 1, 5, and
10%, respectively.
To test whether average sharing differs between male and female dictators, and whether it
depends on the gender of the recipient, we use a two-tailed t-test. Table 2 presents the results.
Using all dictator-recipient pairs (panel (a)) we find that male dictators tend to share more
than female dictators, in both same gender and different gender pairs. Based on the p-values,
however, we cannot reject the hypothesis of no difference in sharing. Using pairs of dictators
and recipients who live in the same village we find that the difference in sharing between men
and women is statistically significant with different gender pairs.
3.2.2. The role of social proximity
The fact that we only find significant gender differences in sharing with pairs of the same village
suggests that the effect of gender interacts with social proximity between dictator and recipient.
Social proximity differs depending on whether dictator and recipient live in the same village,
and if they live in the same village whether they have a friendship tie. While the first source of
variation is exogenously determined by our experimental design, variation in friendship ties is
endogenous, and may be correlated with gender.
As discussed before, there are two important ways in which social proximity can interact
with gender. First, if social proximity influences sharing - as several studies have demonstrated
- and at the same time correlates with gender, gender differences in sharing may be caused
by gender differences in social proximity. For example, women may be less generous than
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men if they have fewer social ties with other people in their village than men. Second, the
influence of social proximity on sharing itself may depend on the gender of the dictator and
recipient. To get a first idea of whether our data support these mechanisms, we will look at
each of these conditions. More specifically, we will have a closer look at whether: 1) social
proximity influences sharing; 2) social proximity correlates with gender; and 3) the effect of
social proximity on sharing depends on gender.
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Figure 3: Sharing by social proximity
In a first step, we study whether social proximity, via social ties and living in the same
village, influences sharing. Overall we gathered social ties data for 100 of the 123 household
heads (81.3%).14 As explained before, we asked each household head whether he or she had
a friendship tie with the other household heads, for each household in the village. We use
friendship ties as OR-ties, i.e. we symmetrize the social ties by assuming that a friendship
relation exists if at least one node mentions the relation.15 Figure 3 shows how the distribution
of coins left to the recipient differs between different levels of social proximity. We observe
that the distribution of coins left to friends is skewed towards higher generosity compared to the
distributions of coins left to non-friends that live in the same village and to strangers. Based on
a two-tailed t-test both differences are marginally statistically significant (two-sided p = 0.099
and 0.073, respectively).
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Table 3: Summary statistics of friendship ties
freq. N
Male-only dyads 31.72% 1,693
Female-only dyads 12.51% 1,870
Mixed gender dyads 12.95% 3,613
In a second step we test whether social proximity via social ties correlates with gender. Ta-
ble 3 reports the frequency of friendship ties. We observe that friendship ties are more common
among male-only dyads than among female-only dyads or mixed gender dyads. Based on a
two-tailed t-test this difference is statistically significant (two-sided p = 0.000 for each com-
parison). The frequency of friendship ties is not statistically different between mixed gender
dyads and female-only dyads (two-sided p = 0.644).
Table 4: Sharing by social proximity
Panel a. stranger non-friend
mean N mean N p-value
all 9.18 57 9.32 231 0.794
men 9.22 27 10.15 100 0.195
women 9.13 30 8.69 131 0.589
Panel b. non-friend friend
mean N mean N p-value
all 9.32 231 10.80 54 0.099*
men 10.15 100 11.86 35 0.083*
women 8.69 131 8.84 19 0.922
Panel c. stranger friend
mean N mean N p-value
all 9.18 57 10.80 54 0.073*
men 9.22 27 11.86 35 0.013**
women 9.13 30 8.84 19 0.858
Notes: t-test with standard errors corrected for multiple
decisions per dictator. ***, **, * indicate two-sided signif-
icance levels at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively.
In a final step we test whether the influence of social proximity depends on the gender of
the dictator. For this we use a two-tailed t-test. Table 4 presents the results. In panel (a) we
compare average sharing between recipients from a different village (strangers) and recipients
from the same village who are non-friends. Differences are not statistically significant. This
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is also the case when we disaggregate by the gender of the dictator. Comparing average
sharing between recipients who are friends and non-friends from the same village (panel
(b)) we only find a marginally significant difference for male dictators. Male dictators share
on average 11.86 coins to friends and 10.15 to non-friends. Finally, comparing average
sharing between friends and strangers (panel (c)) we again find a significant difference
with male dictators (which is now statistically significant at the 5% level), but not with fe-
male dictators. We summarize the main observations of the descriptive analyses in a first result.
RESULT 1. (a) Women tend to share less than men. This difference is strongest when dictator
and recipient live in the same village and have different gender. (b) Social proximity positively
influences generosity of male dictators. (c) Friendship ties are more common among men than
among women and mixed gender dyads.
3.3. Regression analysis: entire sample
In this section we will use regression analysis to obtain a more complete picture of the influence
of social proximity and gender on sharing, taking into account all possible interactions.16 It also
allows us to control for any confounding factors that might have influenced sharing, including
observable and unobservable characteristics of the dictator and the recipient. More specifically,
we will use the following econometric specification:
yi j = β0 +β1δi +β2δ j +β3δi.δi +β4P(1)i j +β5P(2)i j +β6δi.P(1)i j +β7δi.P(2)i j
+β8δ j.P(1)i j +β9δ j.P(2)i j +β10δi.δ j.P(1)i j +β11δi.δ j.P(2)i j +σi + εi j (1)
where yi j denotes the amount of coins dictator i leaves to recipient j. δi and δ j are dummies
that denote the gender of the dictator and the recipient, respectively, being equal to one if male.
P(1)i j and P(2)i j are dummies equal to one if the dictator and recipient live in the same village
and are not friends (P(1)i j), and are friends (P(2)i j). The comparison category is P(0)i j, equal
to one if dictator and recipient are strangers to each other (i.e. they live in a different village).
While the constant term estimates sharing with female strangers by female dictators, the gender
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dummies allow us to estimate sharing with strangers for the other three gender combinations.
The social proximity dummies allow us to estimate the influence of social proximity for female-
female dyads, while to estimate its effect for the other three gender combinations we use the
interaction terms.
Exploiting the within-subject design, σi is the time-invariant error, which captures observ-
able and unobservable characteristics of dictators (i.e. that remain fixed across all their deci-
sions). It also controls for potential experimenter bias (we used five different experimenters),
including the gender of the experimenter, which might influence the dictators’ decisions. ei j
captures any remaining idiosyncratic error.
We will run different versions of this specification. We will start with a basic model that
only includes the gender dummies and their interaction. In a next step we include the social
proximity dummies and in a final step also the interaction between the social proximity and
the gender dummies. This stepwise approach allows us to test the robustness of direct gender
effects, and whether they work via a direct effect or indirectly via social tie formation. The
latter would be supported by the finding that any significant gender effects in the basic model
disappear once we control for social proximity.
We will run all models with and without dictator fixed effects to investigate the robustness
of the results to controls for observable and unobservable characteristics of the dictator. In addi-
tion, as each dictator performed sharing-decisions regarding five different village recipients, the
observations cannot be assumed to be independent. In particular, we have that E
[
ei j,eik
]
6= 0
for all k. For this reason, we will cluster standard errors at the level of the individual dictators.
Table 5 presents the results of the different models. In Models 1-4 we do not find any
statistically significant gender effects. In Models 3 and 4 we find that the coefficient of P(2)
is positive, but only marginally significant when using dictator fixed effects (model 4). On
average dictators tend to leave 1.3 coins more to recipients if they are friends. This positive
effect is robust to adding interaction terms between social proximity and gender (Models 5 and
6). In Model 5 we also observe that the coefficient of the interaction ’Male (rec.) × P(2)’ is
negative and highly significant, which is robust to the use of fixed effects, as we observe in
Model 6.
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Table 5: Determinants of sharing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male (dict.) 1.240 1.213 -0.325
(1.225) (1.207) (2.136)
Male (rec.) -0.677 -0.607 -0.629 -0.559 1.089 0.730
(0.572) (0.541) (0.578) (0.538) (2.043) (1.535)
Male (dict.) × Male (rec.) 0.737 0.893 0.538 0.681 0.375 -1.582
(0.807) (0.657) (0.850) (0.667) (2.909) (1.976)
P(1) 0.201 0.221 0.110 -0.148
(0.562) (0.541) (1.461) (1.254)
P(2) 1.350 1.335* 3.125** 2.972*
(0.877) (0.667) (1.456) (1.491)
Male (dict.) × P(1) 1.748 0.677
(2.030) (1.541)
Male (dict.) × P(2) 1.666 -2.457
(2.513) (1.702)
Male (rec.) × P(1) -1.190 -1.063
(2.220) (1.606)
Male (rec.) × P(2) -8.982*** -4.869***
(2.863) (1.723)
Male (dict.) × Male (rec.) × P(1) -0.293 2.261
(3.264) (2.174)
Male (dict.) × Male (rec.) × P(2) 5.718 6.837***
(3.927) (2.373)
Constant 9.094*** 9.608*** 8.783*** 9.276*** 8.625*** 9.250***
(0.768) (0.161) (0.905) (0.485) (1.441) (0.684)
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
Observations 342 342 342 342 342 342
R2 0.031 0.008 0.039 0.030 0.087 0.076
F 1.521 0.924 1.401 1.952 3.730 3.504
Notes: OLS regression. ***, **, * indicate two-sided significance levels at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively; standard errors (in
parentheses) clustered at the dictator level.
To better understand the effect of social proximity and gender combinations we use the
results of Model 5 to estimate sharing predictions, which are presented in Table 6.17 Panel (a)
presents predicted sharing by social proximity and gender combination. We observe that social
proximity increases generosity for all gender combinations, except F-M. At the same time,
differences across gender combinations are small, except for P(2), i.e. in which dictator and
recipient are friends. Panel (b) tests whether differences in sharing across the different gender
combinations are statistically different from zero. With P(0) differences are not significant,
which implies that baseline altruism does not depend on the gender of the dictator and recipient.
Differences are only significant with P(2). Sharing is significantly lower with F-M than with
each of the other gender combinations.
In a next step we take a closer look at the marginal effects of social proximity for the
different gender combinations. In panel (a) of Table 7 we observe that with male-male dyads
dictators tend to give 1.7 coins more to recipients from the same village who are not friends
relative to strangers, and nearly 2.5 more to friends from the same village. Male dictators
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Table 6: Predicted sharing by gender combination and social proximity
(a) Predicted sharing
M-M M-F F-F F-M
P(0) 9.76 8.30 8.63 9.71
P(1) 10.14 10.16 8.74 8.63
P(2) 11.29 13.09 11.75 3.86
(b) Pairwise comparison across gender combinations a
M-F F-F F-M
M-M 0.482 0.565 0.980
P(0) M-F 0.880 0.511
F-F 0.596
M-F F-F F-M
M-M 0.976 0.541 0.155
P(1) M-F 0.540 0.169
F-F 0.908
M-F F-F F-M
M-M 0.254 0.067* 0.000***
P(2) M-F 0.482 0.001***
F-F 0.000***
Note. Regression results used of Model 5 of Table 5. ***, **, * indicate two-
sided significance levels of an F-test at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. a Two-sided
p-values.
Table 7: Marginal effects of social proximity
(a) Marginal effect by gender combination
M-M M-F F-F F-M
P(1) 1.726* 0.528 -0.148 -1.211
P(2) 2.485** 0.516 2.972* -1.896*
(b) Pairwise comparison across gender combinations a
M-F F-F F-M
M-M 0.417 0.250 0.040**
P(1) M-F 0.662 0.190
F-F 0.511
M-F F-F F-M
M-M 0.232 0.801 0.007***
P(2) M-F 0.155 0.067*
F-F 0.007***
Note. Regression results used of Model 6 of Table 5. ***, **, * indicate two-
sided significance levels of an F-test at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. a Two-sided
p-values
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do not seem to take social proximity into account when paired with a female recipient.
Women tend to be more generous towards female friends of the same village, but not towards
non-friends of the same village. They tend to give nearly 3 coins more to female friends than to
female strangers. Finally, women give less to male recipients from their village. They tend to
give nearly 1.9 coins less to male friends than to male strangers. Panel (b) presents the results
of a pairwise comparison of the marginal effects across the different gender combinations,
using an F-test. The marginal effect of ’P(1)’ is only statistically different between M-M and
F-M. The marginal effect of ’P(2)’, is statistically different between F-M and each of the other
gender combinations. We summarize the main observations in a new result.
RESULT 2. Men share more with men from their village than with male strangers. Women
share more with female friends than with female strangers and share less with male friends
than with male strangers. Differences in the effect of social proximity are statistically significant
between female-male dyads and all other gender combinations.
3.4. Regression analysis: same village sample
In a next step we run the same models using only the same village pairs. This has three advan-
tages. First, it allows us to analyse possible order effects, second, we can use recipient fixed
effects to control for any observed and unobserved characteristics of the recipient, and third, fo-
cusing on within-village variation in sharing could generate new insights.18 More specifically,
we will make the following changes to the specifications used in the previous section. Using
only the sample of same village pairs, we use P(1) as base category. We add dummy variables
to control for order effects, and in an alternative model we use recipient fixed effects instead of
dictator fixed effects. Table 8 presents the results of the different models.
First of all, we find that none of the coefficients of the order dummies are statistically
significant, except the coefficient of decision 5 which is marginally significant in models 1, 2,
4 and 5. The coefficients suggest that in the final decision dictators are somewhat less generous
compared to the first decision when paired with a recipient from the same village, and that the
order does not exert any influence at all between decisions 2 and 5. This supports the claim that
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order effects are limited.
Looking at the direct gender effects, we observe in Models 1 and 2 that several of them
are now statistically significant (remember that we now use a different base category). Model
1 tells us that male recipients tend to receive on average around one coin less than female
recipients. Controlling for dictator fixed effects (Model 2) we find that this negative effect is
absent with male dictators, as indicated by the size of the coefficient of ’Male (dict.) × Male
(rec.)’. So, only female dictators treat male recipients less generously. Using recipient fixed
effects (Model 3) we find that recipients of the same village tend to receive around two coins
more from male dictators than from female dictators. In Models 4, 5 and 6 the coefficient of
’P(2)’ is positive, but only when using dictator or recipient fixed effects (models 5 and 6) is it
(marginally) significant.
Table 8: Determinants of sharing (same village sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Male (dict.) 1.445 2.129** 1.434 2.139** 1.407 2.022**
(1.243) (0.893) (1.219) (0.828) (1.241) (0.888)
Male (rec.) -1.002* -0.737 -0.951 -0.701 -0.099 -0.292
(0.585) (0.503) (0.609) (0.502) (0.675) (0.596)
Male (dict.) × Male (rec.) 0.949 1.394* -0.475 0.677 1.149 -0.978 0.092 0.721 -1.320
(0.913) (0.701) (1.376) (0.995) (0.703) (1.431) (0.909) (0.789) (1.512)
P(2) 1.088 0.862* 1.787* 2.904*** 2.701** 4.308***
(0.885) (0.479) (1.002) (1.066) (1.165) (0.889)
Male (dict.) × P(2) 0.048 -2.445* 0.902
(1.927) (1.392) (2.705)
Male (rec.) × P(2) -7.643*** -3.610** -9.078***
(1.971) (1.389) (2.099)
Male (dict.) × Male (rec.) × P(2) 5.855** 4.028** 5.195
(2.449) (1.626) (3.793)
Decision 2 -0.581 -0.561 -0.653 -0.609 -0.584 -0.530 -0.513 -0.517 -0.225
(0.490) (0.485) (1.310) (0.498) (0.491) (1.248) (0.517) (0.476) (1.232)
Decision 3 -0.559 -0.598 0.120 -0.497 -0.547 0.292 -0.425 -0.436 0.189
(0.546) (0.538) (1.007) (0.555) (0.540) (1.009) (0.548) (0.530) (0.952)
Decision 4 -0.545 -0.551 0.043 -0.514 -0.527 0.158 -0.444 -0.420 0.193
(0.443) (0.443) (1.286) (0.444) (0.440) (1.261) (0.452) (0.424) (1.199)
Decision 5 -0.839* -0.886* -0.654 -0.791* -0.846* -0.605 -0.607 -0.696 -0.555
(0.464) (0.454) (1.219) (0.468) (0.455) (1.201) (0.479) (0.447) (1.108)
Constant 9.679*** 10.146*** 8.932*** 9.495*** 10.004*** 8.615*** 9.140*** 9.827*** 8.655***
(0.836) (0.383) (0.828) (0.854) (0.394) (0.795) (0.969) (0.398) (0.789)
OLS dict. FE rec. FE OLS dict. FE rec. FE OLS dict. FE rec. FE
Observations 285 285 285 285 285 285 285 285 285
R2 0.053 0.036 0.047 0.061 0.051 0.067 0.108 0.077 0.140
F 1.916 3.431 1.485 2.367 3.277 1.953 3.641 4.047 5.932
Notes: OLS regression. ***, **, * indicate two-sided significance levels at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively; standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the dictator level,
except models 3, 6 and 9 in which they are clustered at the recipient level.
In Models 7, 8 and 9 we include interaction terms between the existence of a friendship tie
and the gender dummies. In Model 7 the coefficients of ’P(2)’, ’Male (rec.) × P(2)’ and ’Male
(dict.) × Male (rec.) × P(2)’ are all highly significant. Using dictator fixed effects (Model
21
8) the same coefficients remain statistically significant, and now also the coefficient of ’Male
(dict.) × P(2)’ becomes marginally statistically significant. In Model 9, which uses recipient
fixed effects, we find that the coefficients of ’P(2)’ and ’Male (rec.) × P(2)’ remain statistically
significant, and that also the coefficient of ’Male (dict.)’ is again statistically significant.
Table 9: Predicted sharing by gender combination and social proximity
(a) Predicted sharing
M-M M-F F-F F-M
P(1) 10.14 10.15 8.74 8.64
P(2) 11.31 13.10 11.65 3.90
(b) Pairwise comparison across gender combinations a
M-F F-F F-M
M-M 0.990 0.249 0.159
P(1) M-F 0.262 0.174
F-F 0.884
M-F F-F F-M
M-M 0.258 0.070* 0.000***
P(2) M-F 0.549 0.001***
F-F 0.000***
Note. Regression results used of Model 7 of Table 8. ***, **, * indicate two-
sided significance levels of an F-test at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. a Two-sided
p-values.
To better understand the estimated effects, we again estimate sharing predictions for dif-
ferent gender combinations and levels of social proximity, as presented in Table 9. Results are
very similar as with the entire sample (i.e. that includes matches with strangers). As before, we
also look at the marginal effects of social proximity on sharing, presented in Table 10. Panel
(a) presents the estimated marginal effects of a friendship tie for the different gender combi-
nations. Here again we find that for F-M dyads the effect of a friendship tie is negative, while
it is positive for all other dyads. While this is the case with both dictator and recipient fixed
effects, there are some important differences in the estimated size of the marginal effects and its
statistical significance. With F-F dyads the marginal effect is statistically significant with both
dictator and recipient fixed effects, while with M-F and F-M the effects are only statistically
significant with recipient fixed effects.
Panels (b) and (c) present the results of a pairwise comparison of the marginal effects
across the different gender combinations, using Models 8 and 9, respectively. With dictator
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Table 10: Marginal effects of social tie (same village sample)
(a) Marginal effect by gender combination
M-M M-F F-F F-M
P(2) (dict. FE) 0.674 0.256 2.701** -0.909
P(2) (rec. FE) 1.326 5.210** 4.308*** -4.770**
(b) Pairwise comparison across gender combinations (dictator FE) a
M-F F-F F-M
M-M 0.605 0.113 0.113
P(2) M-F 0.085* 0.302
F-F 0.012**
(c) Pairwise comparison across gender combinations (recipient FE) a
M-F F-F F-M
M-M 0.157 0.091* 0.025**
P(2) M-F 0.740 0.001***
F-F 0.000***
Note. Regression results used of Models 8 and 9 of Table 8. ***, **, * indicate
two-sided significance levels of an F-test at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. a Two-
sided p-values
fixed effects, the difference of the marginal effect of ’P(2)’ between F-F and F-M is statistically
significant, and marginally significant between M-F and F-F. With recipient fixed effects, the
difference is statistically significant between F-F and each of the other gender combinations.
The difference between F-F and M-M is also marginally significant. We summarize the main
observations in a new result.
RESULT 3. Within their village, men and women share more with female friends than with
female non-friends, but women share less with male friends than with male non-friends. Differ-
ences in the marginal effect of a friendship tie are statistically significant between female-male
dyads and each of the other gender combinations. With recipient fixed effects and controls for
social ties there remains a direct gender effect, with men sharing more than women.
3.5. Biases in the reporting of friendship ties
In the analysis of the influence of friendship ties on sharing, so far we ignored potential dif-
ferences in the individual reporting of these ties. However, it is very common for two per-
sons in a dyad not to coincide in the reporting of a friendship tie between them (see e.g.
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Comola and Fafchamps (2014)). To deal with such lack of concordant reporting we have used
OR-ties in the analysis so far, in which we assume there is a friendship tie when at least one
of both nodes in a dyad reports such a tie. One of both nodes in a dyad might forget to report
a friendship tie and the use of OR-ties corrects this. However, there may be two issues with
this assumption. First, there may be gender differences in the reporting of friendship ties, and
second, for its influence on sharing behaviour it may matter who reported the tie, i.e. whether
the dictator or the recipient reported the tie. If both issues are present, estimates of the effect
of friendship ties and its interaction with gender may become biased. We will address both
potential issues in the rest of this section.
To assess the first issue, we look at individual reporting of friendship ties. Table 11 reports
the frequency of reported ties by gender combination. Column (a) presents these frequencies
as proportion of the total number of potential ties. The differences in reported friendship ties
are very similar to the differences we observe with OR-ties (see Table 3). Reported friendship
ties among men are more common than among women (22.45% and 7.44%, respectively),
and based on two-tailed t-test the difference is statistically significant (two-sided p = 0.000).19
Friendship ties among men are also more common compared to mixed-gender ties as reported
by men (two-sided p = 0.000), while friendship ties among women are equally likely as mixed-
gender ties as reported by women (two-sided p = 0.188). Finally, comparing the reporting of
mixed-ties by men and women we observe that men report them equally likely as women do
(6.34% and 9.92%, respectively, and two-sided p = 0.160). This suggests that there is no gender
bias in the reporting of friendship ties.
Table 11: Summary statistics of reported friendship ties
(a) All dyads (b) Alter reports tie
freq. N freq. N
Men - men 22.45% 2,673 28.38% 444
Men - women 6.34% 2,729 11.39% 237
Women - women 7.44% 3,443 17.54% 228
Women - men 9.92% 3,388 17.09% 158
Column (b) reports the same frequencies but conditional on alter having reported a friend-
ship tie. This allows us to study the extent to which ego and alter agree on having a friendship
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tie. We observe that it is very common for ego not to report a tie when alter does. Looking at
same gender dyads, we find that concordant reporting is more common among men than among
women. In 28.38% of the male-male dyads in which alter reports a friendship tie ego also re-
ports such a tie, while with female-female dyads this frequency is only 17.54%. Based on a
t-test this difference is statistically significant (two-sided p = 0.021). Looking at mixed-gender
dyads, we observe that men tend to agree somewhat less on the ties reported by women than
women agree on the ties reported by men, but that this difference is not statistically significant
(11.39% versus 17.09%; two-sided p = 0.269). In sum, while we find a similar picture with re-
ported (i.e. non-symmetrized) ties as with OR-ties, we do find gender differences in concordant
reporting, which is more frequent among men than among women and mixed-gender dyads.
The second issue is related to the fact that we ignore whether it is the dictator or the recipient
who reports the tie, which might matter for its influence on sharing. One might argue that it is
actually the tie as perceived by the dictator that matters most for the sharing decisions, which
supports the use of ties as reported by the dictator. Others might argue that using ties as reported
by the dictator might add measurement error. For example, if the dictator in a pair did not report
a tie between them but the recipient did, we would assume such a tie to be absent (in other
words, we do not exploit the advantage of using OR-ties). It is expected that the importance of
this issue for our analysis increases with gender differences in reporting.
In order to test whether the results reported in section 3.4 are robust to using ties as reported
by the dictator, we run the same regressions but with ties as reported by the dictator. We use
again the same village sample as the definition of social ties only matters for within village
variation in sharing, and by doing so we can again use recipient fixed effects. Table B.1 in
the Appendix presents the results. To make comparison easier we estimate marginal effects for
each of the gender matchings, as presented in Table 12.
In Panel (a) we observe that while the sign of the marginal effects is the same as with
OR-ties (compare Table 10), there are differences in the size and statistical significance of the
effects in some of the gender combinations. With dictator fixed effects none of the effects are
statistically significant, while with recipient fixed effects we observe a much stronger effect
with M-F dyads and a much weaker effect with F-F dyads. In Panel (b) we find that with
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Table 12: Marginal effects of tie as reported by dictator
(a) Marginal effect by gender combination
M-M M-F F-F F-M
P(2) (dict. FE) 1.125 0.686 1.018 -1.691
P(2) (rec. FE) 1.849 8.749*** 1.711* -4.815
(b) Pairwise comparison across gender combinations (dictator FE) a
M-F F-F F-M
M-M 0.600 0.940 0.031**
P(2) M-F 0.806 0.046**
F-F 0.026**
(c) Pairwise comparison across gender combinations (recipient FE) a
M-F F-F F-M
M-M 0.031** 0.950 0.083*
P(2) M-F 0.013** 0.001***
F-F 0.042**
Note. Regression results used of Models 5 and 6 of Table B.1 in the Appendix.
Only pairs of the same village used. ***, **, * indicate two-sided significance
levels of an F-test at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. a Two-sided p-values
dictator fixed effects the marginal effects with F-M are significantly lower compared to each of
the other dyads, which was not the case with OR-ties. In Panel (c) we observe that with recipi-
ent fixed effects the marginal effect with M-F is significantly larger compared with M-M and
F-F, which was not the case with OR-ties. We summarize the main observations in a new result.
RESULT 4. Gender differences in friendship ties are similar with reported (non-symmetrized)
ties and OR-ties, but concordant reporting is more frequent among men than among women
and mixed-gender dyads. Social tie effects in sharing are robust to using ties as reported by
the dictator instead of OR-ties, but tend to be weaker with the former. One exception are M-F
dyads where the effect of friendship ties, as reported by the dictator, has become significantly
stronger than in M-M and F-F dyads.
4. Discussion and conclusion
In rural areas in developing countries gender inequality tends to be severe which might have
serious welfare implications if it determines how scarce economic resources are shared. To
better understand the welfare implications of gender inequality, it is important to know how
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gender influences resource sharing and in what ways social ties interact with this influence. To
address these questions we elicited for a rural village in Nicaragua the friendship ties among
almost all household heads and implemented a series of dictator games played by household
heads with other village recipients as well as strangers.
We found that women tend to share less than men, and that this difference is largest when
dictator and recipient live in the same village and have different gender. We also found that
social ties exert an important influence on sharing and that women have fewer friendship ties
within their village than men. Regression analysis showed important gender differences in the
effect of social ties on sharing. More specifically, while both men and women share more with
female friends than with female non-friends, women share less with male friends than with
male non-friends. Finally, we found that with controls for friendship ties and recipient fixed
effects, there remains a direct gender effect on within-village sharing, with men sharing more
than women.
These results indicate that there are several factors that potentially drive gender differences
in sharing. First, the direct gender effect on resource sharing, which remains after controlling
for friendship ties, could be related to the gender-specific roles in society and the correspond-
ing responsibilities which translate into a gender difference in preferences for resource sharing.
Women’s preference for human capital investments may make them share less than men with
community members outside their household. This would provide support for the hypothe-
sized gender difference in baseline altruism, if the result were not only observed for the same
village sample. The latter suggests that it is not women’s preferences that drives this result (as
we do not observe any gender difference when paired with strangers), but rather men’s larger
generosity towards people from the same village.
Second, an alternative explanation for the gender difference in sharing with people from
the same village might be the smaller (larger) friendship networks of women (men). We indeed
found that friendship ties among women are less common than friendship ties among men,
and are equally common as mixed-gender ties. The difference in friendship networks between
men and women might then influence their expected sharing, if friendship ties exerted a pos-
itive effect on the willingness to share resources, as demonstrated in other experimental stud-
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ies (Leider et al., 2009; Goeree et al., 2010; Bran˜as-Garza et al., 2010; Ligon and Schechter,
2012). However, comparing the results of regression models with and without controls for
friendship ties we did not find any evidence that supports this explanation, at least not at the
aggregate level. This is not surprising as with more advanced analyses we found strong differ-
ences in the marginal effect of friendship ties across the different gender combinations. While
a positive effect of social ties was clearly observed for sharing with women (by both men and
women), sharing among men within the same village was less driven by social tie effects, and
women shared less with male friends than with non-friends. The latter could be driven by
women’s belief that male friends would approve - more than male non-friends - if they kept
more resources for themselves, which would be spent on household consumption, children,
etc. That such deliberation is plausible is supported by the observation that men themselves
tend to be more generous to female friends than to male friends. Women thus seem to correctly
anticipate the generosity of male friends, by keeping more for themselves when matched with
a male friend.20
In closing, our results have implications for policies, especially when these distribute re-
sources or new opportunities (such as development aid) via local communities and networks.
Our results indicate that the gender and the networks of the actors involved in the distribution of
resources can strongly influence actual resource distribution and implied welfare consequences.
Women might receive less resources from others as they tend to have smaller networks than
men. This effect, however, is counteracted by the fact that friendship ties have a stronger posi-
tive effect on the generosity women experience, and that women themselves tend to keep more
resources when matched with male friends than with non-friends. As a result, if policy-makers
wanted more resources to be spent by women – e.g. because they tend to spend them more on
human capital investments – , a potentially effective policy would be to stimulate the formation
of mixed-gender ties.
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Notes
1Whereas some studies did not find any gender effect, others found that women tend to be more generous than
men (see, e.g., Bolton and Katok, 1995; Eckel and Grossman, 1996, 1998; Cox and Deck, 2006; Konow et al.,
2008 and Croson and Gneezy, 2009, for a survey). Evidence on the effect of the recipient’s gender on the giver’s
decision is also mixed. Dufwenberg and Muren (2006) found that men receive less than women and Ben-Ner et al.
(2004) found that if the gender of the recipient is known, women tend to give systematically less to women than
to men and persons of unknown gender.
2Dictator games have been widely used to elicit sharing preferences (see, e.g., Camerer, 2003, chapter 2). In
our experiment neither the term dictator or dictator game was used.
3Some studies have looked at gender and social pressure exerted by spouses or relatives to share income
(Ashraf, 2009; Jakiela and Ozier, 2016). However, with decision-making being private in our experimental set-up,
we do not expect social pressure to have any significant influence on sharing.
4We also considered to pay out only one randomly chosen decision, but decided against it because the expla-
nation and implementation of a randomization device would have been very time consuming and may have also
raised suspicion in our subjects who did not have any experience with economics experiments.
5For a similar design see the one-way identification treatment of Bohnet and Frey (1999).
6We could have opted for a full anonymity design in which only the gender of the recipient is revealed. How-
ever, the application of such a design in settings characterized by extreme gender inequality would likely have
suffered from an experimenter demand effect. For example, it is likely that with such a design male partici-
pants might think that we would appreciate it if they showed generosity towards women who suffer from gender
inequality.
7We cannot exclude that dictators reveal themselves to the recipients after the experiment. We will discuss the
consequences of this in the discussion section.
8For more on such social effects in lab-in-the-field experiments, see Castillo and Carter (2003).
9For more details on the experimental instructions we refer to Appendix A.
10Bounded networks are networks with clearly defined boundaries, such as networks within villages and
organizations, for which all members are surveyed. For a description of the method see, for instance,
the documents section of Jean Ensminger’s and Joseph Henrich’s Roots of Sociality project website at
http://jee.caltech.edu/files/2011/06/Social-Network-Analysis.pdf
11Leider et al. (2009) used an incentivised coordination game procedure to elicit friendship ties among Harvard
students. We did not adopt their elicitation method as it would be too complicated for our subjects.
12In addition to friendship relations we also captured economic relations, neighbour relations, family relations
as well as joint participation in social-public activities. In this article, we only make use of the data of friendship
ties.
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13Bohnet and Frey (1999) and Charness and Gneezy (2008) showed that revealing the identity of the recipi-
ent significantly increases dictator giving. Henrich et al. (2005) also observed proposals of more than 50% in
ultimatum game experiments in some of their investigated small-scale societies.
14Our success ratio is slightly higher than those of Goeree et al. (2010) and Leider et al. (2009), who report
success rates of 77% and 71%, respectively. Of the missing 23 household heads, only two refused to participate
and 21 were not present in the village when we conducted the study.
15In doing so we follow the practices of earlier network studies (cf. Leider et al., 2009; Jackson et al., 2012). In
section 3.5 we will take a closer look at the implications of this procedure by testing the robustness of our results
to the use of the non-symmetrized ties.
16In the descriptive analysis we were unable to take the gender of both dictator and recipient into account as we
needed a sufficient number of observations for each subcategory to come to meaningful statistical comparisons.
17We use the results of Model 5, as the fixed effects in Model 6 make these predictions not estimable.
18A test of order effects makes most sense with the same village village pairs only, as we do not have any
variation with the stranger pair, which was always the first pair. With same village pairs, where people know each
other, it is most important to control for observable and unobservable characteristics of the recipient which can be
done with recipient fixed effects. Moreover, in the sub-sample of stranger pairs we do not have variation in social
ties, which makes that the use of the full sample (including stranger pairs) with recipient fixed effects would force
us to drop one of the social tie categories due to collinearity.
19Standard errors in all t-tests reported are corrected for multiple responses per ego.
20We cannot completely exclude the possibility that dictators revealed themselves to the recipients after our
experiment and that this may have influenced their sharing decisions. Assuming that they would only approach
recipients if they were generous and if they expected their claims about their sharing to be perceived as credible by
the recipients, anticipated reciprocity might have been an additional motive for resource sharing. The weak effect
of social ties for within-village sharing among men and the observation that men share more with men in their
village than with strangers provides suggestive evidence for this motive. Strangers cannot be approached after the
experiment, hence men cannot claim any reciprocity from them; and men might approach friends and non-friends
alike, in an attempt to strengthen or build friendship ties, respectively. This option might appeal especially to men,
who have higher mobility than women.
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Appendix
A. Experimental Instructions
The experimental instructions are originally in Spanish; text between [ ] are instructions for
the experimenter assistant.
We now ask you to participate in an experiment in which you can earn money. The amount of
money you earn is yours, whatever the amount is.
Soon I will give you 20 coins of 1 Co´rdoba and you will be free to divide this amount between
yourself and another person. For this, we use this small black box [show the box]. In this box,
you will find 20 coins of 1 Co´rdoba [open the box and show the 20 coins]. You are allowed to
take as many coins as you wish. The coins you leave in the box will be given to another person.
In particular, we ask you to do the following:
1. Take the number of coins you want to keep out of the box and leave in the box the coins
you want to give to the other person.
2. Refill the box with these small rings [show metal rings] and put the lid on the box. In this
way, I will not be able to see how many coins you will have left in the box, nor can I get
an idea about it through the weight of the box. The weight of the box will always be the
same whatever the amount of coins you leave in the box.
Thereafter, we put a sticker on the box with the name of the person who will get the coins and
we put some tape on it to seal the box. I will give the box to my supervisor, who waits at the
car and who will bring the coins to the other person. Note that you will know the identity of
the other person, whereas that other person will NOT know your identity.
I will now give you some arbitrary examples for further clarification. [Take the coins of one of
the boxes and use them for the examples].
1. You have here 20 coins of 1 Co´rdoba. Imagine that you decide to take 2 coins out of the
box. How many coins will the other person receive? (20 minus 2 equals 18)
2. I will give you another example. Imagine that you decide to take 10 coins out of the box.
How many coins will the other person receive? (20 minus 10 equals 10)
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3. I will give you a final example. Imagine that you decide to take 20 coins out of the box.
How many coins will the other person receive? (20 minus 20 equals 0).
We will repeat this experiment 6 times. Each time, you will be able to take coins and leave
coins for the other person, who will each time be a different one. Thus, I will give you 6 boxes
of 20 coins to divide between yourself and another person. Each time, this person will be a
different one. The first time you will divide the 20 coins with someone from another village
in this region. You will not know this person. The other 5 times you will divide 20 coins with
someone from your community. Once again, note that this other person will NOT know your
identity.
To select the five persons of your community, I will ask you to take small cards from this bag.
Each card has a different number, and each number corresponds to a different person in the
community. After having taken a number, I will look up this number on a list and tell you the
name of that person. Thereafter, I will give you a box with coins, so that you can decide on
the number of coins you keep and how many you give to the other person. When taking this
decision, I will give you privacy. You can go inside your house, [if this is not possible, say: I
will turn my back so that I will be unable to know your decision; give me a signal when you
are ready]. Please do not tell me the decision you will make or you have taken.
After having taken your decision and having closed the box we will seal the box, and you are
not allowed any more to change your decision. Thereafter, we will draw another number from
the bag and I will ask you to take the next decision. [Ask whether the participant has any
questions, and clarify any doubts if needed. If there are no further questions, start with the first
decision.]
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B. Additional results
Table B.1: Determinants of sharing - alternative definitions of tie
a. OR-tie b. tie reported by dict.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male (dict.) 1.407 2.022** 1.085 1.811**
(1.241) (0.888) (1.211) (0.846)
Male (rec.) -0.099 -0.292 -0.566 -0.611
(0.675) (0.596) (0.651) (0.549)
Male (dict.) × Male (rec.) 0.092 0.721 -1.320 0.655 1.034 -0.819
(0.909) (0.789) (1.512) (0.868) (0.711) (1.348)
P(2) 2.904*** 2.701** 4.308*** 2.103* 1.018 1.711*
(1.066) (1.165) (0.889) (1.080) (1.220) (0.896)
Male (dict.) × P(2) 0.048 -2.445* 0.902 4.102** -0.332 7.038**
(1.927) (1.392) (2.705) (1.817) (1.346) (2.776)
Male (rec.) × P(2) -7.643*** -3.610** -9.078*** -7.387*** -2.709** -6.527**
(1.971) (1.389) (2.099) (2.488) (1.187) (3.166)
Male (dict.) × Male (rec.) × P(2) 5.855** 4.028** 5.195 2.801 3.149** -0.373
(2.449) (1.626) (3.793) (2.910) (1.478) (4.762)
Constant 9.140*** 9.827*** 8.655*** 9.477*** 10.054*** 9.052***
(0.969) (0.398) (0.789) (0.934) (0.395) (0.761)
Observations 285 285 285 282 282 282
R2 0.108 0.077 0.140 0.117 0.053 0.135
F 3.641 4.047 5.932 5.728 5.500 4.027
Notes: OLS regression. ***, **, * indicate two-sided significance levels at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively; standard errors (in
parentheses) clustered at the dictator level, except models 3, 6 and 9 in which they are clustered at the recipient level. Controls
used for order effects.
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